Abstract. We derive a polynomial time algorithm to compute a stable solution in a mixed matching market from an auction procedure as presented by Eriksson and Karlander [5] . As a special case we derive an O(nm) algorithm for bipartite matching that does not seem to have appeared in the literature yet.
Introduction
In past years scientists from different fields such as game theory, economics, computer science, and combinatorial optimization have focused on the problem of two-sided matching markets where there are two finite and disjoint sets of agents, P and Q, that are to be matched in pairs consisting of one P -agent and one Q-agent. Two famous models of two-sided matching markets are the marriage model of Gale and Shapley [9] and the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [17] .
In the marriage model (see e. g. [13, 11] ) the two sets of agents are usually referred to as the eligible marriage candidates in some small village. Each agent has preferences over the agents of the opposite set. A marriage is called stable when there is no pair which is not matched but prefers each other over their partners. Using the algorithm named "men propose -women dispose" Gale and Shapley [9] proved the existence of such a stable marriage when the preference lists are strict.
In the assignment game money plays a prominent role. It is modeled as a continuous variable. A matching and an allocation of its weight to the players compose a solution of the assignment game which is called outcome. By a stable outcome we mean a solution where no pair gets allocated less than the weight of its connecting edge. Shapley and Shubik [17] observed that stable outcomes coincide with the primal-dual pairs of solutions of the maximum weighted matching linear program, thereby showing the existence of a stable outcome. However, algorithms and complexity issues of game theoretical solution concepts have raised attention only recently (see e. g. Deng and Papadimitriou [3] , Faigle et al. [6] , Deng et al. [4] ) and the classical algorithm for weighted bipartite matching, namely the Hungarian Method of Kuhn [14] , is not as prominent in game theory as it is in combinatorial optimization.
Quite similar results such as the non-emptiness of the set of stable matchings and the lattice structure of the core have been established for these two models. To find a satisfactory explanation for the similarities in behavior between the two models Roth and Sotomayor [16] themselves offered a first model containing both the two old models as special cases and showed that its set of stable solutions, if it is non-empty, also has the lattice property under certain conditions. Eriksson and Karlander [5] modified this model to the RiFle assignment game, another common generalization of the two old models, and gave an algorithmic proof of the non-emptiness of its set of stable solutions. This algorithm computes a stable solution not in polynomial time but in pseudopolynomial time. For the classical special cases, it coincides with "men propose -women dispose", respectively with the "exact" auction procedure of [2] . The existence of stable solutions in presence of irrational data is proved by Eriksson and Karlander only via arguments from non-standard analysis.
We consider the model of Eriksson and Karlander [5] . A careful analysis of their algorithm reveals that a proper implementation solves the problem in O(n 4 ). This implementation was developed in parallel with [12] where we derive another polynomial time algorithm, to compute a stable solution for the same model, from the key lemma in Sotomayor [18] . Both algorithms run in O(n 4 ), where 2n is the number of players and n 2 is the size of a problem instance. In the next section we briefly introduce the model and its notion of stability. Then we design a polynomial time algorithm to compute a stable solution in Section 3. Finally, we discuss the behavior of the algorithm in the special cases of Stable Matching, Assignment Game and cardinality matching and summarize differences from and similarities to the algorithm from [12] .
Notation
We have two sets of players P (firms indexed by i) and Q (workers indexed by j) w.l.o.g. satisfying |P | = |Q| =: n. Let furthermore P ∪ Q be partitioned into flexible players (F ) and rigid players (R). Consider the complete bipartite graph on P∪Q. An edge (i, j) is called rigid if one of i or j is in R and flexible, otherwise. For each edge (i, j) there are nonnegative numbers a ij and b ij . The sum a ij + b ij is the productivity of a cooperation between i and j. A pair of functions u : P → R and v : Q → R is called a payoff. If i cooperates with j and (i, j) is a free edge the productivity can be freely divided into payoffs u i and v j while u i = a ij and v j = b ij must hold if (i, j) is a rigid edge.
A stable outcome is a stable payoff (u, v) together with a bijective map µ :
Let µ : P → Q be a map. If µ(i) = j then we say i proposes to j. A proposal is called free or rigid if the corresponding edge is free resp. rigid. A firm i (a worker j) is called mapped if i ∈ µ −1 (Q) (resp. j ∈ µ(P )) and unmapped, otherwise. If there are firms i 1 , i 2 so that µ(i 1 ) = µ(i 2 ) = j then j is called doubly mapped. We denote by Q U the set of unmapped workers, Q 2µ the set of doubly mapped workers, Q R the set of workers that have a rigid proposal, and by Q 2R the set of workers with at least 2 rigid proposals.
Let furthermore
is rigid and v j = b ij and µ(i) = j 0 otherwise define the possible profit of i from j if j receives v j . The strategy of the algorithm is the following: The map µ always defines stable relations but is not necessarily injective. In the course of the algorithm we will try and increase |µ(P )|, keeping stability of the relations, until the map is injective. The procedure to increase |µ(P )| acts on the augmentation digraph G (v,µ) = (P ∪ Q, A) with backward arcs (j, i) for µ(i) = j and forward arcs (i, j)
is the set of workers that maximize the potential benefit of firm i. A directed path P in G (v,µ) that connects a doubly mapped worker j 1 ∈ Q 2µ with another worker j s is called (µ-)alternating resp. (µ-)augmenting if j s is not mapped.
An Algorithm to Find a Stable Outcome
Eriksson and Karlander [5] assume integer data and in one step increase a free payoff by at most one. We modify this approach in such a way that we increase the payoff by the smallest possible amount that changes the augmentation digraph. Our strategy to make the map µ : P → Q bijective is as follows: As in the classical "men propose -women dispose" algorithm from Gale and Shapley [9] workers with more than one rigid proposal choose the best one and dispose the rest. This way some firms become temporarily unmapped. Each of these unmapped firms has to place another proposal until every worker has at most one rigid proposal. Next, we search the graph G (v,µ) for alternating paths that reach a worker in Q U ∪ Q R and alternate the map µ along the path. If none of the above is possible, we increase the payoffs v of workers which are reachable by an alternating path until G (v,µ) receives a new edge and the process is repeated until the map becomes injective.
The algorithm uses several sub-procedures:
Alternate(P): µ is alternated along the alternating path P, i. e. all arcs are reoriented and µ is modified such that it uses the new backward arcs. If P is augmenting then the size of the image of µ increases by 1. BFS(G, Q 2µ ): Returns all vertices reachable from Q 2µ in G. PlaceRigidProposals: This procedure is the "men propose -women dispose" algorithm of Gale and Shapley [9] . Here, we denote by P U the set of temporarily unmapped firms. See Algorithm 2. HungarianUpdate: Increases the payoffs of all workers reachable from a doubly mapped worker. See Algorithm 3 for details.
Algorithm 1 An Algorithm to Find a Stable Outcome v ← 0 PlaceRigidProposals while Q2µ = ∅ while ∃ µ-alternating path to j ∈ (Q \ µ(P )) ∪ QR do Alternate(P) PlaceRigidProposals end while HungarianUpdate end while Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 eventually finishes with a stable outcome and can be implemented to run in O(n 4 ) time.
Proof. In any iteration of the inner loop of line 4 in Algorithm 1 |µ(P )| is increased or a rigid proposal is disposed. If there is a path to Q \ µ(P ) then |µ(P )| increases. If the path ends in j ∈ Q R then PlaceRigidProposals is called and disposes at least one rigid edge. Note, that a rigid edge once disposed will never be proposed again. If no path exists at all then v is increased by HungarianUpdate until this is the case and in each call of HungarianUpdate at least one new arc shows up in G (v,µ) . Thus, the procedure is finite.
Algorithm 2 PlaceRigidProposals while PU = ∅ do for all i ∈ PU do Propose(i) end for for all j ∈ Q2R do Let i * be the favorite proposal in µ −1 (j)
Dispose(j, i * ) vj ← bi * j end for end while Algorithm 3 HungarianUpdatē
The while-loop in line 4 of Algorithm 1 might be iterated more than once without finding a path as desired. Anyway, HungarianUpdate can be implemented so that its consecutive calls until a path is found need O(n 2 ) time in sum including an update of the augmentation graph by reusing the BFSstructure from the previous call and storing a minimum distance ∆ j from unmapped vertices and vertices in Q R to the current BFS forest (see e. g. Galil [10] or Hochstättler et al. [12] for details). Hence, after O(n 2 ) time steps we can augment µ or dispose a rigid edge which can happen at most O(n 2 ) times. Hence, without considering the complexity of PlaceRigidProposals the algorithm runs in O(n 4 ). We also can implement PlaceRigidProposals at a total cost of O(n 4 ) without any effort. For the first call we have to place n proposals taking O(n 2 ) time including the time to find a favorite partner for any i ∈ P . Note that the preference lists may change during the course of the algorithm thus, sorting the lists in a preprocessing does not suffice to speed up the procedure. For each discarded rigid edge we have to find a new favorite partner and after each call of PlaceRigidProposals in the inner while-loop we may freely use O(n 2 ) to update the augmentation graph which happens at most O(n 2 ) times taking the number of rigid edges into account. Thus, the overall complexity of PlaceRigidProposals is O(n 4 ). As the total cost of Alternate is bounded by O(n 3 ) we get a total complexity of O(n 4 ). Next we will show that the algorithm produces a stable outcome. In any stage of the algorithm letū i := max j f . As v monotonically increases we also have v ≥ 0. A worker with no proposer always has payoff zero and is therefore of non-negative value to all firms. Hence together with (iv) and (v) this implies u ≥ 0. When the algorithm terminates µ is bijective and thus, (ū, v; µ) is a stable outcome.
Special Cases and Remarks
Cardinality Matching If R = ∅ and a ij + b ij ∈ {0, 1} for any edge (i, j) the problem reduces to finding a matching of maximum cardinality among edges with productivity 1 (referred to as 1-edges). The presented algorithm (see Algorithm 4 for the reduced version) does not seem to have appeared in the literature yet and differs from the standard approach which starts with an empty matching M and searches the graph of 1-edges G 1 M for an M -augmenting path. The algorithm presented here starts with a total but not surjective (and therefore not injective) map µ on the set of nodes in P with at least one 1-edge. A µ-alternating path in the graph of 1-edges G 1 µ is a path from a doubly mapped worker to an unmapped worker using only 1-edges (forward) and µ-edges (backward) and is used to modify the map in a similar fashion as the augmentation of matchings is done in more classical algorithms. Here, the size of the image of µ increases. If no such µ-augmenting path exists, then the set of doubly mapped workers Q 2µ together with the set of firms which are mapped to a worker not in Q 2µ form a vertex cover of G 1 µ with the same cardinality as the image of µ resulting in a maximum matching constructed from µ as in Algorithm 4 (e. g. [8] ). If a perfect matching exists, we turn a total (not necessarily injective) map into an injective map instead of making a partial injective map (i. e. a matching) total. 
While the standard approach is essentially due to Ford and Fulkerson [7] the approach presented here reminds of the preflow-push algorithm (see e. g. [1] ), as in the first step we send as much flow as possible from nodes in P to nodes in Q. Then, nodes in Q 2µ correspond to excess nodes, i. e. nodes that violate Kirchhoff's law. However, the strategy of lifting node potentials in preflow-push in successive steps does not seem to have anything in common with the augmenting path procedure used here.
A naive implementation of Algorithm 4 leads to an O(nm) algorithm. Note, that the main difference to the classical approach is in the orientation of the arcs in the search graph. While in the standard approach backward arcs are matchings, here we have exactly one backward arc ending in each non-isolated vertex of P . Thus, the ratio of forward to backward arcs decreases and the search tree in average should be shorter. We wonder if this approach might lead to more efficient implementations for cardinality matching.
Weighted Bipartite Matching If R = ∅ the algorithm reminds of the Hungarian Method. Like the latter our method is a primal-dual algorithm and can be viewed to start with a weighted vertex cover (u, v) if we set u i ← max j f (v,µ) ij . We then search for alternating paths or update the payoffs if no such path can be found. Up to a different notion of an augmenting path (i. e. a different algorithm for cardinality matching) and a different orientation of the search graph this strategy is identical with that of the Hungarian Method (see e. g. Frank [8] for a transparent presentation).
Stable Marriage When F = ∅ our model coincides with the Stable Marriage Model, since the a ij at firm i resp. b ij at worker j may as well be replaced by preference lists. The algorithm is identical to the classical "men propose -women dispose" algorithm of Gale and Shapley [9] , that proceeds in rounds.
Comparison with the Algorithm in [12] The algorithm in [12] to find a stable outcome differs from the algorithm presented here in various ways. In [12] (especially rigid) proposals are made asynchronously and not in rounds as in the present implementation. Furthermore, this algorithm is a direct extension of the Hungarian Method as introduced in Kuhn [15, Variant 2] , while the algorithm presented here is a direct extension of the original "men propose -women dispose" algorithm of Gale and Shapley [9] . Also the concepts of augmenting paths differ as described above.
